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A SPECIALIZED COURT FOR SOCIAL SECURITY? A
CRITIQUE OF RECENT PROPOSALS
Robert E. Rains -/
Three proposals have been made that would create a
Social Security Court to hear appeals from Social Security
claimants. House of Representatives bills 4419 and 4647 were
placed before Congress in 1986. The third proposal is a draft
bill on which the United States Department of Justice is working.
The concept of such a court is favored by the secretary of
Health and Human Services, Dr. Otis R. Bowen. The Justice
Department draft was described in a February 1986 letter by
Secretary Bowen to the Office of Management and Budget, but the
bill itself is not yet publicly available.
On March 9, 1986, when knowledge of the draft legisla-
tion was disseminated, the Reagan Administration publicly
articulated support for the "concept" of a Social Security
Court. Within ten days, the first of two bills proposing the
removal of Social Security cases from judicial review in federal
district court and placing it in an Article I Social Security
Court was introduced in the House of Representatives. These
bills, H.R. 4419 and H.R. 4647, therefore may be viewed as trial
balloons or stalking horses for the Administration.
Currently, the Social Security Act provides that an
individual who is aggrieved by a final decision of the Secretary
of Health and Human Services may bring an action within sixty
days in the district court of the United States for the judicial
district in which the plaintiff resides. Appeals from final
district court decisions are heard by the United States Court of
Appeals for that circuit. Decisions of the circuit courts may
be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court on a writ of
certiorari.
I/ Assistant Professor of Law and Supervisor of the Disability
Law Clinic, The Dickinson School of Law. J.D., 1974, Harvard
Law School. This article first appeared in 15 Florida State
University Law Review 1 (Spring, 1987) and is reprinted here by
permission. Most footnotes in the original article have been
omitted.
The proposals would remove all or almost all Social
Security appeals from the federal district courts and vest them
in a new Social Security Court. The judges of this Social
Security Court would not be article III judges entitled to "hold
their Offices during good Behaviour." Rather, the judges of the
Social Security Court would be article I judges serving fixed
terms of ten years. Appeals from the Social Security Court
would lie in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
Four days prior to the introduction of H.R. 4419,
forty-one members of the House of Representatives introduced a
resolution strongly disapproving any proposal to establish a
Social Security Court. Representative Peter Rodino, chairman of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, published an open letter
to the Editor of the New York Times condemning the proposed
Social Security Court. The American Bar Association's House of
Delegates pass 9 a resolution at its August 1986 meeting opposing
the proposal. -
One cannot fully appreciate the concerns about estab-
lishing an Article I Social Security Court without understanding
the administrative system it would review and that system's
recent history. Thus, the author in this Article looks at the
existing Social Security determination system, with an overview
of some of its difficulties and malfunctions, particularly those
occurring during this administration. The author then describes
the Social Security Court proposals, the justifications for
those proposals, and finally critiques the proposals.
I. THE CURRENT SYSTEM
"The camel is a horse designed by a committee." anon.
When President Reagan telephoned artificial heart
recipient William J. Schroeder in December 1984 to wish him
well, Mr. Schroeder complained that he was getting the "runaround"
from the Social Security Administration on his claim for disability
benefits filed that March. The next day, government officials
delivered a Social Security check to Mr. Schroeder's hospital
2/ The issue has been raised again, however, and is now under
study by the National Conference of Administrative Law Judges,
Judicial Administration Division, ABA. - Ed.
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room. Mr. Schroeder's predicament is symptomatic of problems
within the administrative system. However, most claimants do
not have the benefit of the publicity attendant to being a
pioneer artificial heart recipient nor of the sympathetic ear of
the President of the United States.
A. Administrative Review Process
An applicant for Social Security benefits enters a
multi-tiered administrative process. The Social Security Act
dictates that "the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] is
directed to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the
rights of any individual applying for a payment under [Sub-
chapter II - Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
Benefits]." The first level of the administrative process is an
initial determination of eligibility, usually by a state agency
under contract to the Secretary, with notice of the decision
coming from the Social Security Administration (SSA). The
claimant who receives an unfavorable or only partially favorable
decision on the initial determination may file for "reconsidera-
tion," the second level of administrative decisionmaking.
Reconsideration is usually performed by the state agency that
made the initial determination.
If dissatisfied with the results of reconsideration,
the claimant may obtain a hearing before an Administrative Law
ludge (ALJ) of the Social Security Administration. The claimant
nay appear at the hearing with or without witnesses and present
Dral testimony to supplement the file of medical, vocational and
)ther exhibits. Testimony is taken under oath, and a complete
record is made. This ALJ hearing constitutes the third level of
idministrative decisionmaking.
Claimants dissatisfied with the result of the ALJ
earing may request the fourth level of administrative decision-
aking, review by the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council need
ot wait for a claimant to request review, and may initiate
eview of any ALJ decision, even one which is favorable to the
laimant, on its own motion. There is limited opportunity for a
ersonal appearance of the claimant or his representative before
he Appeals Council which is located in Arlington, Virginia.
he Appeals Council is the final level of administrative review.
B. Judicial Review Process
The decision of the Appeals Council is the final
dministrative decision of the Secretary. The aggrieved claimant
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may then appeal this decision to the federal district court
where the claimant resides. The district court reviews the
record to determine whether the Secretary's decision is supported
by "substantial evidence." Applying this test to Social Security
appeals, the Supreme Court has stated that substantial evidence
is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." The definition has been applied to other statutory
situations.
Describing the administrative process, Justice Powell
has written rather glowingly: "[T]o facilitate the orderly and
sympathetic administration of the disability program of Title II,
the Secretary and Congress have established an unusually protective
four-step process for the review and adjudication of disputed
claims." While some aspects of the process may indeed be
protective of claimants, all too often claimants find themselves
mired in an administrative morass. Ironically, Justice Powell's
description came in a challenge to admitted unreasonable delays
in the process.
While the claimant is subject to a strict sixty-day
limit to appeal each adverse determination to the next level,
the Secretary is not bound to render decisions at any level
within any specific time. Justice Powell noted that, "the
legislative history makes clear that Congress [is] fully aware
of the serious delays in resolution of disability claims."
Largely because Congress had failed to impose time limitations
on the Secretary, the Court overturned an order of the Second
Circuit enjoining the Secretary to adjudicate all future disa-
bility claims according to judicially established deadlines and
to pay interim benefits in all cases of noncompliance with those
deadlines.
II. RECENT PROBLEMS
Exacerbating the delays inherent in any four-tier,
state/federal system has been the aggressive process of continuing
disability reviews of current recipients, particularly in 1981
through 1984. The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980
required the Secretary to review recipients of Social Security
disability insurance benefits at least once every three years
unless a finding had been made that the disability was permanent.
The SSA spurred by this Congressional prod to review claimants,
and finding it consistent with its own budgetary interests,
undertook a massive purge of the disability rolls. The toll in
human terms ultimately was well reported in the media. Horror
stories abounded of the most seriously ill persons being found
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no longer disabled. During the first two years of this purge,
many of these individuals lost their monthly benefit checks
while they appealed their disability status, even though they
ultimately prevailed on their claims.
From a systems standpoint, the Secretary's equating of
a direction to review with a mandate to purge created new
pressures on the already heavily burdened adjudicatory systems
at all levels. In the 1983 fiscal year, the Office of Hearings
and Appeals received over 134,000 requests for hearings in
Continuing Disability Review (CDR) cases, accounting for 36.4%
of the requests received. The SSA's own reinstatement statistics
bear witness to an unconscionably high rate of wrongful termina-
tions during this period. By March 1984, federal officials were
reporting that over 470,000 people had been removed from the
disability rolls in the preceding three years, 160,000 had
already been reinstated after appeals, and another 120,000 cases
were pending. Suddenly, the administrative system had to cope
with the influx of hundreds of thousands of terminated disability
recipients appealing their cases.
A. Nonacauiescence
Further confusion has been caused by the Reagan
Administration's aggressive use of the policy of "nonacqui-
escence." Nonacquiescence as practiced by the SSA is the policy
Df not applying the rule of law enunciated by a circuit court of
appeals to other claimants who reside within that circuit.
The SSA has adopted two forms of nonacquiescence. The
tirst and most obvious form is the issuance of a formal Social
Becurity Ruling directing agency personnel, including ALJ's and
mployees of the state agencies, not to follow a specific
Pircuit court decision. A variation involves Social Security
tulings instructing ALJ's and the Appeals Council as to the
Ieaning of circuit court decisions with which the SSA does not
Icquiesce. While the ALJ's and Appeals Council apply the SSA's
Interpretation of these decisions, the state agencies would not
ven attempt to implement the decisions.
The most pernicious variation of nonacquiescence is
ilence. Rather than issue a public ruling of nonacquiescence,
he administration simply disregards the holding of a case
xcept as applied to the named plaintiff. Consider, for example,
situation in which the SSA nonacquiesced in a series of
ircuit court decisions governing the standards to be employed
a its continuing disability reviews. The state agency, ALJ's
rd Appeals Council would continue to apply the invalidated
provision to claimants, including those who reside within the
circuit, to deny them disability benefits. On appeal, of
course, the district court applied the circuit precedent and
reversed or remanded. However, since only a small percentage of
claimants pursue their cases into the federal court system, many
cases are never adjudicated under the relevant precedential
decisions.
As with continuing disability reviews, the SSA policy
of nonacquiescence is not a creation of the Reagan Administration,
but under that administration it has been greatly expanded.
Earlier rulings were extremely rare and usually concerned rather
limited issues.
For many claimants nonacquiescence creates a dual
system of adjudication in which their claim will be denied at
all four administrative levels and granted an appeal to federal
court, if they have the sophistication and resources to obtain
judicial review. A useful analogy for understanding the appli-
cation of nonacquiescence to a particular claimant would be a
traffic system where the maximum legal speed is forty-five miles
per hour to a policeman and in traffic court but fifty-five
miles per hour on appeal to county court. A duty-bound policeman
arrests the motorist who is doing fifty miles per hour on the
highway. The motorist is taken to traffic court, found guilty
of exceeding the speed limit, and his driver license is suspended.
Many months or a year or two later, the reviewing county court
reverses, finding that he was driving within the speed limit.
His conviction is overturned and his license is ordered reinstated.
To make the analogy complete, it takes the bureaucracy several
more months to return the driver license. Needless to say, our
unhappy motorist may have suffered rather severe consequences
from his license suspension. Of course, most terminated disability
recipients have lost something more vital than their driver
licenses: their sole source of income.
The impacts of nonacquiescence on the adjudicatory
system have been manifold. This dual system of adjudication
increases both the number of cases appealed to federal court and
the reversal and remand rates. Nonacquiescence has been challenged
directly in complex class action litigation in the courts.
B. Bowen v. City of New York
Not only has the SSA failed to follow circuit court
precedent, it has also been found to have ignored its own
regulations in denying disability benefits. One would expect in
a stem of this size cases in which courts find that the agency0a
violated its regulations. However, in Bowen v. City of New York
[106 S. Ct. 2022 (1986)], the SSA was found to have adopted a
systematic, covert policy of avoiding its regulatory sequential
evaluation process in adjudicating claims of disability based
upon mental impairment.
In the sequential evaluation process, at each of the
four administrative levels, each claim is evaluated through a
flow chart of up to five steps. The first inquiry is to determine
whether the individual is doing "substantial gainful activity."
If so, he is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. If not, the
adjudicator proceeds to the second consideration, whether the
individual suffers from a severe impairment that meets the
durational requirements. If not, he is not disabled. If so,
the adjudicator proceeds to the third consideration: a determi-
nation of whether the individual has an impairment that meets or
equals one on the "Listing of Impairments." If so, he is
disabled. If not, the adjudicator is mandated to proceed to the
fourth consideration: whether the individual can return to past
relevant work. If he can, he is not disabled. If not, the
adjudicator must proceed to the final consideration: whether
the individual can do alternative work.
From 1978 to 1983, the SSA was found to have a "fixed
clandestine policy against those with mental illness" in violation
of the sequential evaluation process. Where such claimants did
not meet the Listings, the SSA did not proceed to step four in
the evaluation, but instead routinely denied their claims. The
Court unanimously upheld relief for mentally disabled class
members, including those who had failed to exhaust their admin-
istrative remedies and those who had failed to seek timely
judicial review. The SSA was ordered "to reopen the decisions
denying or terminating benefits and to redetermine eligibility."
Although it is too early to quantify the impact of the Supreme
Court's affirmance, there is no doubt that the administrative
system will suffer a significant additional burden in handling
these reopened cases. Moreover, this is not the only ruling by
which a court has ordered SSA to reopen numerous cases because
of surreptitiously adopted "illegal standards for denying
disability benefits."
In City of New York, the Court noted the trial court's
finding, not challenged by SSA on appeal, that: "SSA relied on
bureaucratic instructions rather than individual assessments and
overruled the medical opinions of its own consulting physicians
that many of those whose claims they were instructed to deny
could not, in fact, work." The trial court concluded that "the
resulting supremacy of bureaucracy over professional medical
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judgments and the flaunting of published, objective standards is
contrary to the spirit and letter of the Social Security Act."
C. Bellmon Review Proaram
Sadly, such pressures by the SSA during the Reagan
Administration have not been limited to physicians. As it had
done with the Continuing Disability Review program, the SSA
responded to another Congressional mandate to tighten procedure
and construed it to pressure ALJ's to deny benefits. The
Bellmon Amendment to the Social Security Disability Amendments
of 1980 required the Secretary to implement a program of reviewing
ALJ's decisions for accuracy and reporting back to the Congress
on his progress. The SSA's Bellmon Review Program initially
targeted for review only ALJ's with high allowance rates; that
is, those ALJ's who awarded benefits at a rate higher than
average. Those ALJ's were targeted for possible "counseling,"
"behavioral modification" and "other steps." Although the
justification for the program was to seek consistency in ALJ
decisionmaking, no similar pressure was exerted on ALJ's having
denial rates substantially above the national average. The
reason given for focusing exclusively on high allowance ALJ's
was that ALJ's denying benefits were already subject to review
by claimants appealing their decisions. However, this disregards
that a very substantial number of claimants who are denied at
the ALJ level never take an appeal. Many ALJ's complained that
pressure exerted on high allowance ALJ's compelled ALJ's to deny
benefits.
Citing these and other abuses, the Association of
Administrative Law Judges sued the Secretary and high SSA
officials in the District Court for the District of Columbia to
enjoin the Bellmon Review Program. The court denied relief on
the ground that the defendants had "shifted their focus," making
injunctive relief unnecessary "at this time." However, after
reviewing the evidence, the court made several important findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The court found no authority in
the Bellmon Amendment or its legislative history for the SSA to
target high allowance ALJ's for review, counseling and possible
disciplinary action. The court found persuasive evidence that
the SSA "retained an unjustifiable preoccupation with allowance
rates" which put "pressure [on ALJ's] to issue fewer allowance
decisions." Thus "the Bellmon Review Program created an untenable
atmosphere of tension and unfairness which violated the spirit
of the APA, if no specific provision thereof." The court also
found that the SSA ignored the "decisional independence"
afforded to ALJ's by the Administrative Procedure Act by "the
injudicious use of phrases such as 'targeting', 'goals' and
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'behavior modification' [which] could have tended to corrupt the
ability of administrative law judges to exercise that independence
in the vital cases that they decide."
D. The Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984
Concerned about problems within the administrative
system, Congress enacted the Social Security Disability Benefits
Reform Act of 1984 (SSDBRA). The House Committee on Ways and
Means found three areas where reform appeared necessary:
[I]n the standards for determining eligibility for
disability benefits, both for new applicants and more
particularly for current beneficiaries being reviewed; in
the structure of the administrative process itself; and in
the way in which the Social Security Administration [sic]
makes disability policy, both on its own initiative and in
conjunction with rulings of the Federal courts.
The enacted version of SSDBRA addresses these critical areas,
and others, with varying degrees of precision.
SSDBRA provides a statutory standard of review for
termination of disability benefits which requires substantial
evidence either of the recipient's medical improvement or of one
of several other medical or vocational scenarios. These provi-
sions rejected the SSA's policy of evaluating continuing dis-
ability review (CDR) cases with the same standard as new appli-
cations and judging them on a "current evidence" of disability
standard. SSDBRA ordered the courts to remand pending CDR
termination cases to the SSA for redetermination under the new
standards. Former recipients whose cases were remanded were
authorized to elect to receive benefits until a new initial
redetermination was made. Although the Act mandated the SSA to
prescribe implementing new regulations no later than 180 days
after the date of enactment, they were not promulgated until
fourteen months later, in December 1985. Processing of affected
individuals is ongoing--another burden on the administrative
system that the SSA largely brought upon itself.
The Act also provided explicit language relating to
the evaluation of claims of disability based on pain or other
subjective symptoms, an area of frequent conflict between SSA
and the courts. The Act overruled the SSA's refusal to consider
any impairment unless it is itself "severe" and mandated that
the combined effect of all of the claimant's impairments should
be considered. In addition, the Act provided for a moratorium
on mental impairment reviews until the SSA revised the criteria
embodied under "Mental Disorders" in the Listing of Impairments.
Finally, the Act extended the temporary policy of allowing a
recipient found to be no longer disabled to continue receiving
benefits pending a hearing decision.
Although SSDBRA is reform legislation aimed at curing
many of the deficiencies described above, it is not a panacea.
Some areas were left vague, most were left for interpretation by
the SSA, and the issue of nonacquiescence was not resolved.
Unable to grapple fully with evaluation of pain as a disability,
the Act mandated the Secretary to establish a Commission on the
Evaluation of Pain to study the issue and report back to Congress.
Although both the House Bill and the Senate amendment had spoken
directly to the policy of nonacquiescence, the final enacted
version mandated only that the Secretary establish "uniform
standards" which shall be applied at all levels of determinations,
review and adjudication. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Committee of Conference noted that, in reaching this compromise,
the conferees did not intend to approve "'nonacquiescence' by a
federal agency to an interpretation of a United States Circuit
Court of Appeals as a general practice." Thus, while SSDBRA
offers the hope of real improvements in the administrative
adjudication process, it does not solve all the problems, and it
is too early to see its full impact, particularly because of the
SSA's slow implementation.
III. THE COURT PROPOSALS
Against this background of administrative and other
difficulties, proposals to create a Social Security Court are
resurfacing. The two bills introduced in the 99th Congress and
the draft Justice Department bill have similarities and important
differences.
A. H.R. 4419
The "Social Security Procedural Improvements Act of
1986," H.R. 4419, addresses both the administrative process and
judicial review. Title I would empower the Secretary to decide
unilaterally to take over a state agency's disability determination
function and to convert the state employees to employees of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services. Title II
would abolish the fourth administrative step, the Appeals
Council, but would not make the ALJ's decision the final decision
of the Secretary. Rather, the bill contemplates that the
Secretary must issue a final decision after the ALJ decision and
provides for interim benefits where the ALJ decision rules
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favorably and no final decision is issued within ninety days.
Just what entity within SSA would issue this final decision is
left unstated. Since the ALJ's decision is not the final
decision, the purpose for abolishing the Appeals Court is
unclear. It is worth noting that currently the Appeals Court is
not mandated by statute.
Title II would create a Social Security Court to hear
appeals of final administrative decisions. There would be
twenty judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. Judges would serve terms of ten years and be subject to
removal by the President for specified cause after the opportunity
for a hearing. The chief judge would be empowered to appoint
"commissioners" who are "to proceed under such rules and regula-
tions as may be promulgated by the Court." The precise function
of these commissioners is left unclear, but presumably they
would perform a function akin to that of United States Magistrates
in federal district court. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit would have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear appeals from the Social Security Court.
B. H.R. 4647
The "Social Security Reorganization Act of 1986,"
H.R. 4647, likewise addresses both administrative procedures and
judicial review. Title I would establish the Social Security
Administration as an independent agency separate from the
Department of Health and Human Services and governed by a Social
Security Board appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. The Board would in turn appoint a Commissioner of
Social Security.
Title III would make major changes in the administra-
tive process. A disability claimant or recipient "who makes a
showing in writing that his or her rights may be prejudiced by
any decision the Secretary has rendered" would be entitled to an
evidentiary hearing held by a "hearing officer employed in the
Department of Health and Human Services."
There would be substantial limitations on the scope
and manner of the ALJ's review. The ALJ would review cases
after the hearing and then only if he first determines that the
application for review raises at least one of five enumerated
ssues. Thus, the current de novo ALJ hearing, the most favorable
eview step for claimants, would be eliminated. The ALJ could
ot consider an objection which has not been urged before the
earing officer below "unless the failure or neglect to urge the
bjection is excused because of extraordinary circumstances." 105
It is left unclear exactly how the frequently unrepresented
claimant, in a supposedly nonadversarial hearing, is supposed to
urge these factual and legal objections to a decision that is
not yet issued at the time of the hearing. The ALJ would not be
empowered to hear additional evidence, but under certain circum-
stances could order additional evidence to be taken before the
hearing officer and made a part of the record.
Either party--the claimant or the Secretary--would be
allowed to appeal to an ALJ an adverse hearing decision.
However, if the Secretary appeals a decision granting benefits
and the ALJ has not issued a decision within sixty days of the
hearing officer's decision, the Secretary would have to pay
interim benefits to the claimant.
In short, the hearing officer would assume functions
akin to those performed by ALJ's currently, and ALJ's would
assume functions similar to those performed by the Appeals
Council. The ALJ's decision would "be binding on all parties,
including the Secretary," and would become the final decision of
the Secretary. The Secretary generally could not on his own
motion review an ALJ decision favorable to a claimant. By
implication, the Appeals Council, as such, would cease to exist.
Section 2001 would establish a Social Security Court
to hear most appeals of final administrative decisions. There
would be twenty judges appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate. Judges would serve terms of ten years and be
subject to removal by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit for specified causes after the opportunity for a
hearing.
Under Title II, the federal district courts would
retain jurisdiction over Social Security appeals in actions
which present a claim or cause of action arising under the
Constitution, or a challenge to the validity of a Social Security
regulation. This residual jurisdiction in the district courts
would be "subject to a stipulation" between the parties that
there is no dispute as to the material facts of the case and
that a statutory or regulatory provision is the only bar to the
alleged claim. Jurisdiction is unclear when the plaintiff
alleges that only an illegal statute or regulation bars his
recovery but the Secretary refuses to so stipulate. It appears
that the Secretary could keep all cases out of district court by
such a refusal.
Title II explicitly authorizes either the Secretary or
the Social Security Board to file an appeal of a final decision
fav rable to a claimant in the Social Security Court. Thus,log
although the ALJ's decision would be binding on the Secretary,
he could appeal it. However, if the Secretary appeals an ALJ
decision that is favorable to the claimant and if the Social
Security Court does not render final judgment within sixty days
of the ALJ decision, the Secretary would be required to pay
interim benefits.
Section 2002 contains curious provisions concerning
remands. If the Secretary moves for a remand before filing an
answer, the court may remand the case "for further action by an
administrative law judge or hearing examiner in the Administra-
tion." Also, the court may remand at any time under certain
conditions for "additional evidence to be taken before a hearing
examiner in the Administration." The hearing examiner, in turn,
is to file his decision with an administrative law judge. This
decision is reviewable by the ALJ "to the same extent as the
original decision and findings." Given this language, it would
appear that the "hearing examiner" in this title occupies the
same position as the "hearing officer" in Title III.
Appeals from the Social Security Court would lie in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Apparently appeals of stipulated cases in the federal district
courts would also be vested in the Federal Circuit.
C. The Draft Justice Department Bill
The only information currently available to the author
on the draft Justice Department bill is contained in Secretary
Bowen's letter to the Office of Management and Budget of Febru-
ary 4, 1986. According to that letter, the draft bill would
create a Social Security Court divided into "five regional
divisions each with a chief judge and six associate judges, as
well as a chief judge of the entire court." The court would
bave "exclusive jurisdiction at the initial stage of judicial
review of virtually all actions arising under title II or
title XVI of the Social Security Act." There would be an
internal mechanism designed to ensure that the decisions of the
various judges of the court would be "consistent and uniform."
"Final decisions of the [c]ourt would be reviewable at the
discretion of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, but
review would be mandatory where the Secretary of Health and
iuman Services certified that a case presented a question with
broad or significant implications in the administration or
interpretation of the social security laws."
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A SOCIAL SECURITY COURT
The proponents of creation of a Social Security Court
offer various justifications for their proposals. Representative
Tauke, sponsor of the H.R. 4647, argues that:
Reforming the adjudication and appeals process for
Social Security benefit claims will end the unfairness
of the current complex, confusing, and often arbitrary
system of determining eligibility, particularly for
disability benefits. The current system, with four
levels of administrative review plus judicial review
by one of 94 federal district courts, one of 12
circuit courts, and the Supreme Court, was simply not
designed to handle the approximately 1.5 million
disability claims decided each year. (Over 50,000
cases are pending before the federal courts. Last
year alone, 28,000 disability cases were appealed to
the courts.) Not only is the system incredibly
expensive and time-consuming, it is disjointed and
creates rather than resolves controversies both within
the administrative process and before the courts.
Representative Archer, sponsor of H.R. 4419, similarly argues
that "[t]his should assure consistent, uniform, and more expert
handling of court cases, and eliminates the potential for
conflicting circuit court opinions."
One of the most vocal advocates of a Social Security
Court, Fred Arner, a consultant to the SSA, has likewise emphasized
that such a court would provide "more uniform decision-making."
[Arner, The Social Security Court Proposal: An Answer to a
Critique, 10 J. LEGIS. 324, 326-327 (1983).] Arguing that a
Social Security Court would "alleviate the nonacquiescence
problem," Mr. Arner has articulated the following objectives:
"(a) increased uniformity in decisionmaking by the judiciary and
a concomitant increase in uniformity at all levels of the
adjudicative process, and (2) relief to an already overburdened
federal judiciary and a vehicle for the more effective handling
of social security cases." He also argues that the SSA's policy
of nonacquiescence would be unnecessary under a Social Security
Court. Further, Mr. Arner has cited the 1978 SSA-funded study
of the National Center for Administrative Justice (hereinafter
the Center Report) for the proposition that, while Article III
judges might be superior in general intellectual ability to
specialized court judges, specialized experience may produce
greater technical expertise and heightened awareness of the
potential impact of any particular decision on a program.
Secretary Bowen likewise has cited the benefits of "uniformity
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and timeliness of court decisions," avoidance of conflicts among
the circuits, and improved judicial review process because the
Social Security Court judges "would become more expert in Social
Security and SSI cases than district judges." Finally, it has
also been suggested that a Social Security Court might handle
cases more speedily than the federal district courts.
Thus, the purported interrelated benefits of an
Article I Social Security Court may be summarized as follows:
1. uniformity/fairness/alleviates need for non-
acquiescence;
2. designed specifically for Social Security system/more
expert handling;
3. relief of overburdened federal judiciary; and
4. more effective/efficient handling of cases.
V. A CRITIQUE OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS AND THE PROPOSALS
In this section the author will examine the justifica-
:ions for a new Social Security Court. Such justifications
.nclude uniformity, expertise and docket congestion. The author
:oncludes that these justifications do not warrant creation of a
tew Article I Court. The perceived difficulties with the system
!an more readily be solved through return of the administrative
krocess.
A. The Uniformity Issue
It cannot be seriously questioned that uniform decision-
aking is a desirable, if unobtainable, goal in implementing a
ederal program. Vesting judicial review in one court has a
ertain superficial attraction in advancing that goal. Particu-
arly if decisions are appealed from that court to one appellate
ourt, uniform law would be expected to develop. Of course, the
pplication of such uniform doctrines to individual cases will
over be an exact science.
To justify abandoning of the current judicial review
stem on this basis, one must first posit that there is sub-
antial, unresolved nonuniformity of decisional law on important
sues among the circuits. Further, it must be posited that the
A lacks appropriate means of resolving these differences. 109
Certainly there are important issues that have been
recurrently addressed by the circuit courts: for example,
allocating the burden of proof or persuasion, assessing subjective
complaints, determining the weight to be given treating physicians'
reports, setting standards for termination, and considering
"non-severe" impairments. Obviously, the circuits do not always
speak with one voice on these important issues; however, they
are generally in substantial agreement.
Where nonuniformity on important issues exists among
the circuits, there are two traditional and obvious sources of
redress: Congress and the Supreme Court. As noted above,
Congress did address certain important, vexing issues in SSDBRA,
such as standards for termination, consideration of multiple
complaints, and evaluation of subjective impairments. Of
course, the Supreme Court often grants writs of certiorari to
resolve splits among the circuits. For example, the Court has
granted the Secretary's petition for a writ of certiorari in
Yuckert v. Heckler [774 F. 2d 1365 (9th Cir., 1985)] to review
the legality of the current regulations on evaluation of non-
severe impairments.
Yuckert is instructive because, as is frequently the
case, the split is more between the Secretary and the circuits,
than among the circuits themselves. The Secretary's severity
regulations have been struck down by the Third, Seventh, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits. While the Sixth Circuit has upheld the
challenged regulation, it has provided an interpretation of the
regulation similar to that reached in the circuits that have
held it invalid. Nevertheless, the Secretary appropriately
sought Supreme Court review of the issue. [The Supreme Court
has since reversed Yuckert v. Heckler, 107 S. Ct. 2287 - Ed.]
In other cases, the SSA's obstinate refusal to seek
certiorari where there is either a split among the circuits or
when the circuits simply all disagree with the SSA's position,
perpetuates nonuniform interpretation. Nonuniformity exists
largely between the SSA and the circuits rather than among the
circuits themselves. The reality is that the SSA objects to
relatively uniform adverse decisions largely brought about in
recent years by the SSA's obstinance or, as in some instances
described above, its lawlessness.
The cry of nonuniformity is a smokescreen. One can
only suspect that the administration favors the establishment of
the Social Security Court in the hope that such a court would
abandon settled precedent and create new precedent more favorable
to the Social Security Administration.
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If the SSA truly wishes to obtain a more efficient
system with more uniform results and better success on judicial
review, it might start by correcting its own internal nonunifor-
mity. As noted by Representative Tauke:
At the height of the continuing disability review
controversy, SSA data disclosed that 98 percent of the
disability cessation determinations issued by the state
agencies handling the first and second steps of the review
process were correct. Yet when the beneficiaries appealed
to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), more than two-thirds
were put back on the disability rolls. Something was
clearly wron with the way state agencies were evaluating
these claims, but the ALJ decisions had no discernible
impact on the practices of the state agenc4s.
hs long as the SSA clings to the myth that the state dgency
determinations are ninety-eight percent accurate and continues
to instruct the state agencies to nonacquiesce, it will maintain
a system of internal nonuniformity. The SSA perpetuates the
problem by refusing to recognize and implement the "corrective
function of review."
Whatever the theoretical justifications for nonacqui-
escence as practiced by the SSA, a systemic need for such
monacquiescence based on nonuniformity simply does not withstand
scrutiny. Since the judicial rulings to which the SSA objects
are normally the ones it has lost, the decision to seek
7ertiorari lies with the administration. No change in the
3tructure of judicial review is necessary to remedy the
ionuniform precedent as currently exists. It is necessary for
the administration to file for certiorari in appropriate cases.
The argument for a Social Security Court premised on
ionuniformity can only stand if the SSA can demonstrate that the
!upreme Court has denied its requests for certiorari in a
,ignificant number of cases in which splits exist among the
ircuits on important Social Security issues. Currently, no
uch showing has been made.
B. Article I or Article III Judges?
Curiously, none of the published justifications for
he Social Security Court proposal explain the supposed
vantages of establishing such a court under Article I of the
nstitution, instead of under Article III. Assuming that the
stifications set forth above are realistic and desirable and
at a Social Security Court is the way to obtain them, it
remains unclear why it should be an Article I court.
Ironically, Representative Tauke, seeking cosponsors for
H.R. 4647, asserted that the bill would result in
"depoliticizing" the Social Security Administration. Even
proponents of the Social Security Court have acknowledged the
need to assure the independence of its judges. Mr. Arner has
suggested extending the proposed term of the judges from ten to
fifteen years, the same as exists for Tax Court judges.
The recent history of the Social Security Administra-
tion--replete with uncontested findings of improper pressure to
deny benefits placed upon physicians and those administrative
law judges who grant benefits "too often" --emphasizes the
critical need for truly independent judicial review. Replacing
Article III lifetime tenure judges with Article I judges hardly
advances this independence. Varying the proposed term length of
Article I judges may have some effect on the sense of independence
of these judges, but it cannot provide the independence intended
for Article III judges. All of the perceived benefits of a
Social Security Court surely could be obtained by staffing such
a court with Article III judges, without the detriment of
diminished independence.
If the Social Security Court judges are not
Article III judges, they become, essentially, another set of
administrative law judges superimposed over the ALJ's who hear
the administrative cases. If they are not to duplicate the
function of the ALJ's, and are to provide judicial review, they
should be Article III judges. If they are not to provide
judicial review, their purpose is unclear.
C. Matters of Expertise
The Social Security Court judges, however constituted,
supposedly would gain increased expertise over district court
judges in handling Social Security cases, thereby benefitting
the system. It is clear that judges who exclusively address one
area of the law gain enhanced expertise in that area; however,
it is less clear what benefit will derive from an incremental
gain in expertise. To posit a significant systemic gain, one
must assume a lack of expertise on the part of sitting federal
district judges. This is not only insulting to the bench, but
is belied by the statistics. As of the spring of 1986, over
50,000 disability cases were pending in federal court, 28,000 of
which were filed in 1985 alone. Although cases frequently are
referred to a United States magistrate to make an initial
report, usually it falls to the district judge to review these
reports and rule on exceptions. Therefore, the number of cases
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reviewed, either initially or after a magistrate's report, by a
typical federal judge is quite large. For proponents of a
Social Security Court to argue that federal district judges are
on the one hand overwhelmed by Social Security cases and on the
other hand lack expertise in handling them is contradictory.
Furthermore, this rationale relates to the SSA's underlying
problems. It assumes that where the SSA is reversed, the
decision of the federal judge is "wrong" and the administrative
decision below is "right." This, of course, is one underlying
premise behind the assumption of the ninety-eight percent
accuracy rate at the initial determination level and behind
nonacquiescence.
D. Meaningful Chance in the Administrative System
Unquestionably, creation of a Social Security Court
would relieve sitting federal district judges of a significant
portion of their dockets, but it would do so at the expense of
establishing a whole new judicial system to shoulder the burden.
To truly relieve existing strain on judicial review, the SSA
should improve its administrative decisionmaking. All too
often, reconsideration and the Appeals Council Review are hollow
exercises in rubber-stamping and delay. The Center Report found
that with regard to the Appeals Council "[t]he most distinctive
feature of judicial review in the disability area is . . . the
high proportion of cases that result in a remand for further
administrative proceedings ...... ".The Secretary is given an
unqualified privilege to retract before he files an answer those
decisions he does not want to defend. This privilege is
exercised by the Secretary in one out of every eight disability
cases filed, which accounts for more than forty percent of all
remands.
One of the allegedly overburdened circuit judges,
udge Posner of the Seventh Circuit, has added this observation:
I have read many administrative law judges' decisions
in social security disability cases, all of which the
disappointed applicant has asked the Appeals Council
to review (as he had to do, before he could begin
judicial review proceedings), but I can remember only
one occasion on which the Appeals Council wrote an
opinion, even when the administrative law judge's
decision raised difficult questions.
udge Posner has suggested that it would be easier and cheaper
or Congress to create at the Appeals Council level a tier of
credible appellate administrative judges who would write
opinions in all but frivolous cases.
The burden on the federal courts will not be
ameliorated by switching that burden to a new court while
keeping the current administrative system essentially intact,
with different standards at different levels and often
perfunctory review at the highest administrative level.
Meaningful administrative reform would certainly lessen the
burden on any judicial review system.
E. Expediting Judicial Review
It is suggested that a Social Security Court will
expedite judicial review of cases. No doubt this, too, is a
consummation devoutly to be desired. One must question how this
can be possible while providing the touted expert review. As
noted by the sponsors of H.R. 400, there are now 531 federal
district judges to review Social Security cases. Frequently the
initial judicial review is performed by a United States
magistrate to whom the district court refers the matter. In
some instances, by consent of the parties, the magistrate
actually renders the final decision at the district court level.
There are now nearly as many United States magistrates as
federal district judges, totaling approximately 1,000 federal
district judges and magistrates.
Exactly how twenty to thirty-six full-time Social
Security Court judges will be able to handle some 55,000 Social
Security cases on judicial review more efficiently than the
existing bench remains somewhat mysterious. No doubt they will,
to some extent, rely upon their law clerks as do the district
judges and magistrates. Still the numbers seem overwhelming.
One can readily imagine these judges being forced by the sheer
number of cases to abdicate their authority and duties to
unappointed, unconfirmed "analysts," such as those who now
perform a similar function within the Appeals Council. The
price of expedition and expertise would surely be a superficial,
hit-or-miss judicial review process.
F. Appeal to the Federal Circuit
Finally, it is difficult to perceive the benefit of
vesting all appeals from the proposed Social Security Court in
the United States Court for the Federal Circuit. This
specialized appellate court was created out of a merger of the
Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
Unlike the other circuit courts, its jurisdiction is defined by
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subject matter, not geography. Moreover, the workload of the
Federal Circuit is considerably heavier than was anticipated
when it was created in 1982. Some 2,500 appeals are now
docketed annually. Whereas the proposed Social Security Court
would hear nothing but Social Security cases, for the Federal
Circuit these cases would be an additional burden to the
existing caseload. This one circuit court would be expected to
do the work now being performed by twelve circuit courts. With
its already full docket, it is difficult to perceive how the
Federal Circuit can be expected to handle Social Security
appeals from all over the United States expeditiously and
thoroughly.
Additionally, exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal
Circuit based in Washington, D.C. will cause great difficulty or
hardship for claimants seeking or required to argue their cases.
Frequently, these claimants are indigent, and often are
represented by legal services or legal aid attorneys. Absent
provision for the Federal Circuit judges to "ride the circuits,"
claimants will be placed at extreme disadvantage in arguing
appeals. This can hardly promote fairness.
The answer to the high number of Social Security cases
appealed to the federal courts and the high rates of reversal
and remand is for the Social Security Administration to cure
itself by examining its own procedures and standards critically,
and not assuming blindly that it is initially correct ninety-
eight percent of the time, while it is the review system that is
erroneous. It is the administrative process, not the judicial
review process, that is in need of serious reform. The Social
Security Disability Benefits Reform Act was an ambitious first
step toward the reform mandated by Congress. Indeed, while SSA
ay be marching to Thoreau's different drummer, one suspects
hat it is more akin to our little Johnnie with whom everyone
Ise is out of step.
